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Several recent studies have shown a negative as-
sociation between motherhood and wages. How-
ever, an analysis of change over time in the moth-
erhood penalty has not been conducted. Using two
cohorts of young women drawn from the 1975–
1985 National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Women and the 1986–1998 National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, we explicitly test the relationship
between motherhood and wages across two co-
horts and examine whether that relationship has
changed. Even after controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity and human capital variables, each
additional child is associated with a negative ef-
fect on women’s wages. Moreover, our findings
suggest that the penalty has not diminished over
time.
As the 21st century begins, women may be ap-
proaching equality, but mothers are still far be-
hind. (Ann Crittenden, The Price of Motherhood:
Why the Most Important Job in the World Is Still
the Least Valued, p. 7)
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Since the 1960s, traditional roles specifying
husbands as breadwinners and wives as home-
makers have been eroding. Social commentators
and scientists, in fact, often characterize the past
two or three decades as a time of women’s in-
creasing economic independence, largely in ref-
erence to the marked increase in women’s labor
market involvement in recent decades. Although
women’s labor force participation has been in-
creasing for at least a century, the trend acceler-
ated in the 1960s. The proportion of married
women with children under age 6 who worked in
the labor market (either full-time or part-time) in-
creased from 44% in 1970 to almost 71% in 1998
(Casper & Bianchi, 2001; Spain & Bianchi, 1996).
The gender wage gap has also narrowed, largely
driven by cohort replacement (Blau & Kahn,
2000).
Recently, however, a few studies have identi-
fied a phenomenon termed the motherhood pen-
alty, which suggests that the intersection between
work and family for women is problematic. The
key finding from these studies is that the average
wages of mothers are less than those of women
without children, even after controlling for human
capital, labor market experience, and part-time
work status (Anderson, Binder, & Krause, 2002;
Budig & England, 2001; Korenman & Neumark,
1991; Taniguchi, 1999; Waldfogel, 1997a).
Although taken together these studies span
over 30 years of data (Budig & England, 2001;
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Korenman & Neumark, 1991; Waldfogel, 1997a),
an explicit analysis of possible change over
time—in particular, a decline—in the size of the
penalty in a single analysis has not been conduct-
ed. This study thus examines the motherhood pen-
alty for two cohorts of young women to determine
whether the penalty has significantly shifted
across time. To do so, we draw on data from the
1975–1985 waves of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Young Women (NLS-YW) and the
1986–1998 waves of National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Youth (NLSY).
BACKGROUND
The nature of the intersection between mother-
hood and work outside of the home has shifted
over the past few decades. From the 1950s
through the 1970s, women who had children often
dropped out of the labor force, if they could afford
to do so, as the result of several factors. These
included public attitudes regarding working moth-
ers, social norms about mothering, discrimination,
and the lack of available child care. Consequently,
paid labor and children were often incompatible
in the lives of women (Casper & Bianchi, 2001;
Spain & Bianchi, 1996).
Between the 1960s and today, women’s labor
force participation rate rose dramatically, partic-
ularly among White women (Bianchi & Spain,
1996). Prior to the mid-1960s, most of the in-
crease involved women who were past their child-
bearing years. Beginning in the late 1960s and
1970s, however, the increase in women’s labor
force participation spread to younger women, es-
pecially mothers of young children (Bianchi &
Spain). By 1990, the employment patterns of
White, Hispanic, and Black women had con-
verged, such that women were not systematically
leaving the labor force when they reached their
childbearing years (Klerman & Leibowitz, 1999;
Spain & Bianchi, 1996; Yoon & Waite, 1994). By
the year 2000, the majority of mothers (74%) were
in the labor force with more working full-time,
rather than part-time (Bachu & O’Connell, 2001).
Related recent trends include wage gains among
younger cohorts of women workers, along with
some diminishment of the long-standing gender
gap in wages, increasing labor force attachment
throughout life, delayed childbearing, and some
decline in occupational sex segregation beginning
in the 1970s (Bianchi, 1994; Casper & Bianchi,
2001; Jacobs, 1989). Educational investments also
increased; in 1990, three quarters of women had
12 years or more of schooling compared with 43%
30 years earlier (Spain & Bianchi, 1996).
At the same time, numerous studies over the
years suggest that parenthood, directly or indi-
rectly, decreases women’s earnings and earnings
potential (Hanson, 1983; Hudis, 1976; Waite,
Haggstrom, & Kanouse, 1985). In an effort to jug-
gle the dual responsibilities of paid employment
and family, for example, women still have more
sporadic participation in the labor market than
men (Moen, 1992); may choose part-time or shift-
work jobs that may be unrelated to their education
and training (Presser & Baldwin, 1980); and may
forsake earnings for ‘‘convenient’’ work attri-
butes, such as flexible hours or proximity to one’s
home (Stolzenberg & Waite, 1984).
More recently, a handful of studies has uncov-
ered a more subtle phenomenon: that motherhood
impacts women’s status in the labor market, not
because of part-time work or sporadic participa-
tion, but by way of a motherhood penalty to wag-
es. These studies find that even controlling for
women’s ‘‘human capital’’ (i.e., education, work
experience); job characteristics; and unmeasured
attributes of women that may be related to pay,
mothers earn less than their childless counterparts
(Anderson et al., 2002; Budig & England, 2001;
Taniguchi, 1999; Waldfogel, 1997a, 1997b; see
Budig & England for a useful theoretical discus-
sion of the sources of the motherhood penalty).
Estimates of the size of the penalty vary, but
the existence of a penalty is replicated across stud-
ies using different data, methodologies, measures
of motherhood, and varying sets of control vari-
ables. For example, studies using a survey called
the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Wom-
en, which provides coverage of a cohort of wom-
en who began entering the labor market in the
1970s, estimate a motherhood penalty of about
3% per child (Taniguchi, 1999), or about 3%–5%
for one child and 5%–7% for two or more chil-
dren (Anderson et al., 2002), after controlling for
multiple human capital and sociodemographic
variables. Studies based on a similar survey, but
one that focuses on a later cohort of women en-
tering the labor force in the 1980s (i.e., the
NLSY), suggests the motherhood penalty to be
roughly 7% per child, or 5% for one child and
10% for two children, net of various factors that
may affect earnings (Budig & England, 2001;
Waldfogel, 1997a).
Given that a wide array of characteristics of
the women and jobs are taken into account in
these studies, researchers conclude that the re-
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maining or residual penalty to mothers is likely
due to some combination of two factors: produc-
tivity or employer discrimination, neither of which
can be measured with available survey data (Bu-
dig & England, 2001). The idea behind the pro-
ductivity explanation is that mothers may be less
productive on the job than nonmothers because
the latter can spend more of their nonemployment
time in leisure, rather than in household work and
child care (Budig & England, p. 206). The dis-
crimination explanation is more self-explanatory,
encompassing any number of ways that employers
treat mothers differently than other women and
men in terms of job placement, promotion, or pay
levels within jobs (Budig & England, p. 208).
The goal of our study is straightforward, and
that is to answer an important empirical question:
Has this price of motherhood declined over time?
Specifically, we examine whether there has been
a decline over the past few decades in the effect
of motherhood on women’s wages by formally
testing for statistically significant shifts. Unfortu-
nately, substantial differences across studies in
model specification, operationalization of moth-
erhood, and model estimation techniques do not
allow us to draw any conclusions from existing
research about whether and how the motherhood
penalty has changed over time. Although two
studies (Waldfogel, 1997b; Waldfogel & Mayer,
2000) use two cohorts of women in a single anal-
ysis, their main focus is elsewhere (i.e., maternity
leave in one study and gender differences in the
low-wage labor market in the other), and the anal-
yses do not formally test for differences over time
in the effects of motherhood.
There is some reason to suspect that the pen-
alty has declined. One could speculate that em-
ployer discrimination against mothers may have
attenuated, as employers no longer have to fear
that any woman who has a child will automati-
cally withdraw from the labor market. As more
mothers stay in the labor market and the average
human capital differences among women with
children are narrowed, statistical discrimination
should weaken (Marini, 1989); in other words, the
perception that mothers are somehow less stable
or productive than other employees decreases and
employers may begin to treat mothers like other
workers. Additionally, in terms of productivity, re-
cent changes may improve the situation for moth-
ers. First, men and husbands have slightly in-
creased their contributions to childcare and
housework, suggesting that employed mothers
may be getting more real leisure over time (Bian-
chi & Casper, 2000; Casper & Bianchi, 2001).
Secondly, ‘‘family friendly’’ workplace policies
may facilitate the balance of work and family,
thereby reducing any productivity differentials be-
tween mothers and childless women.
One can also, of course, construct scenarios in
which the motherhood penalty remains steady or
widens. For example, employers may now de-
mand more from all employees, as the traditional
male model of work behavior is expected of and
replicated by more women and mothers. Even if
a woman does not alter her work behavior after
the birth of a child, an employer may be more
suspicious of any deviations from the ‘‘proper’’
worker (i.e., the man whose family obligations
had no impact on his work behavior) than in pre-
vious years. Additionally, statistical discrimina-
tion may continue if negative stereotypes regard-
ing mothers’ employment persist despite changes
in behavior.
CURRENT INVESTIGATION
This study compares the motherhood penalty for
two cohorts of women and systematically tests
whether effects have changed over time. Although
past research shows that a mother penalty exists,
we do not yet know whether there has been tem-
poral change in the penalty.
Following past research, we estimate two types
of models to examine changes in the size and sig-
nificance of the penalty over time, while control-
ling for basic sociodemographic and human cap-
ital characteristics (e.g., Anderson et al., 2002;
Budig & England, 2001; Waldfogel, 1997a). First,
we estimate pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)
models; this type of model compares women who
do not have children at a given point in time with
those who do (net of other independent variables).
Second, we estimate a fixed-effects model that
controls for stable (i.e., unchanging), but unmea-
sured, differences among individuals. As argued
by Budig and England, fixed-effects models
‘‘eliminate bias created by failure to include con-
trols for unmeasured personal characteristics’’ (p.
213). For example, if childless women differ from
mothers in terms of an unmeasured characteristic
such as ambition, fixed-effects models will elim-
inate this bias. Essentially, if a penalty is found
when estimating the fixed-effects models, this im-
plies that the penalty is due neither to factors that
we measure in the models nor to stable unmea-
sured ones.
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METHOD
Data
We draw the two cohorts of women used in the
analysis from the NLS-YW and the NLSY. The
NLS-YW is comprised of women who were be-
tween the ages of 14 and 24 in 1968. The sample
is designed to be nationally representative; Black
women were oversampled. Sample attrition has
been relatively small (CHRR, 1997), and 18
waves of the survey had been conducted as of
1995. The more recent cohort is drawn from the
NLSY, which began in 1979 with a nationally rep-
resentative sample of 12,686 men and women be-
tween the ages of 14 and 21, including oversam-
ples of Black and Hispanic participants. The
respondents were interviewed each year until
1994, when the survey shifted to a biennial design
(CHRR, 1999).
These data are well suited to our research ques-
tion. As large samples of two birth cohorts, rather
than cross-sections of the population at any age,
they permit temporal comparisons. Inferences
about change over time require that comparisons
be age-specific (Menard, 1991; Ryder 1965; see
Smock, 1993, and Sweeney, 2002, for similar use
of the NLS data to examine cohort change). To
attain as much age comparability as possible be-
tween the two cohorts, we restrict the earlier co-
hort to only include information from 1975
through 1985 and the later one from 1986 through
1998. In 1975, the women in the NLS-YW range
from 21 to 33 years of age, when most have likely
completed their schooling and are thus poised to
enter the workforce. By 1985, the women are 31
to 42 years, with the oldest women nearing the
end of their childbearing ages. Similarly, the
women in the NLSY are 21–29 years old in 1986
and 33–41 years old in 1998. Although by limit-
ing the data to include only women who are 21
years of age or older we are excluding early child-
bearers, this underestimation will occur in both
cohorts and will thus have no effect on the as-
sessment of the change over time.
The sample is restricted to include only women
with at least 2 years of reported wages. At least
two observations are necessary to calculate fixed-
effects models, and we use this rule for the OLS
models as well for comparability. This restriction
results in the loss of a substantial minority of re-
spondents (799 respondents in the early cohort,
130 respondents in the late cohort), and thus pos-
sible selection bias. For example, women may ex-
perience or anticipate the wage penalty and simply
withdraw from the labor force, and women who
are most negatively affected by the penalty may
be most likely to withdraw. Although unfortunate,
this bias is true of all research that has used fixed-
effects models to examine the motherhood wage
penalty (Budig & England, 2001; Taniguchi,
1999; Waldfogel, 1997a). Moreover, our central
aim is to investigate change in the penalty across
time, and whatever bias exists is likely to be there
for both cohorts. A general implication is that cal-
culations of the penalty may be conservative in
their estimation, because they only capture the
penalty among women who work outside of the
home in at least 2 years.
Our final sample size is 3,032 women in the
earlier cohort and 5,213 in the later cohort. Ar-
ranged in person-year records as the unit of anal-
ysis as needed for the statistical models, our sam-
ple size is 55,369 records: 14,282 person-years in
the early cohort, and 41,087 in the late cohort. In
the early cohort, a woman on average contributes
5.40 person-years (minimum 2, maximum 7); in
the more recent cohort, women average 9.03 per-
son-years (minimum 2, maximum 11).
Measures
Following past research, our dependent variable is
the log of hourly wages; the natural log is used in
order to normalize the distribution of wages. Ex-
tremely low wages (less than $1) were dropped
(292 records), and extremely high wages (greater
than $200) were top-coded at $200, then logged
(54 records).
We operationalize the key independent vari-
able, motherhood, with a continuous measure of
number of children. This measure has also been
used in past research and has the advantage of
simplicity and ease of interpretation (Budig &
England, 2001, p. 217). The children may be bi-
ological, adopted, or stepchildren living (or who
have lived) in a woman’s household. Thus, for the
purposes of this analysis, a woman who has given
birth but has never lived with her child is not con-
sidered a mother, whereas a nonbiological mother
who lives with step- or adopted children is con-
sidered a mother. It is important to underscore that
the former is rare: The vast majority of children
under age 18 do live with their biological mothers
(Casper & Bianchi, 2001; Fields, 2001). Addition-
ally, past findings suggest that the motherhood
penalty is likely produced at least in part from
lower productivity or employer discrimination
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(Budig & England); these factors are arguably af-
fected more by the presence of children in the
household, rather than biological children who
have always lived elsewhere.
The other independent variables were selected
because of their reported significance in past re-
search, their centrality to the wage determination
process, and our ability to attain consistency in
measures over the two cohorts. We include di-
chotomous variables for the highest completed
year of schooling; a continuous measure of age
and age squared; and years of part-time (fewer
than 35 hours/week) and full-time (35 hours or
more/week) work experience as well as their
squared terms. We measure part-time and full-
time work experience separately because part-time
experience may be less valuable than full-time ex-
perience (see Waldfogel, 1997a). Because mothers
tend to have more part-time experience than child-
less women, they will likely be disproportionately
affected by the lower returns generated by part-
time work histories. There is incomplete account-
ing of work experience between the years 1973
and 1975 in the NLS-YW; we thus follow impu-
tation procedures outlined by Waldfogel (1997a,
pp. 210–211) to help construct our measure.
Additionally, we include a series of dichoto-
mous measures representing marital status (mar-
ried, divorced, separated, and widowed) with nev-
er married as the reference category and a
measure of being Black, with non-Black as the
reference category. However, the variable for race
is only included in the OLS regression because
constant terms drop out of fixed-effects models.
Finally, to evaluate cohort change, we con-
struct an interaction term that multiplies number
of children by a dichotomous variable for cohort.
To test the change over time, we combined the
two cohorts and created a dummy variable for the
cohort, interacting this with all of the independent
variables in the model, including the continuous
children variables. We test whether this coefficient
is statistically significant in a full, pooled model
(i.e., cohort is interacted with all of the indepen-
dent variables in the model), allowing us to ex-
amine whether and in what direction the mother-
hood penalty has altered over time. Coefficients
for the interaction terms can be found in the Ap-
pendix.
Models
We first present results from a pooled, OLS model
in which women have a record for every year that
they responded to the survey. This model com-
pares women with themselves at other points in
time as well as to other women (see Anderson et
al., 2002; Budig & England, 2001; Waldfogel,
1997a). Structuring the data in this way allows the
incorporation of time-varying characteristics of
individuals in order to fully exploit the longitu-
dinal information (Allison, 1984). Note that be-
cause each woman contributes more than one re-
cord to the data, the data are clustered, meaning
that the observations are not independent. We thus
also correct the standard errors; if not corrected,
the standard errors would be too small, sometimes
by a factor of two or more (StataCorp, 1997). Fi-
nally, to prevent women who contribute more ob-
servations from disproportionately affecting the
results, the OLS coefficients have been weighted
by the inverse of the number of times a woman
appears in the data.
We next present one-way (across person) fixed-
effect models, which are well known for their
ability to control for stable, unobserved hetero-
geneity—the possibility that unmeasured factors
may affect both motherhood and wages. In fixed-
effects models, the variables are calculated as de-
viations from individual means. The model is as
follows:
(y 2 ȳ ) 5 (x 2 x̄ )b 1 (« 2 «̄ )it i it i it i
where i indexes individuals, t refers to time, and
x symbolizes a matrix of independent variables. «
denotes the residual that is homoscedastic with a
mean of zero. The coefficients of the fixed-effects
models should be interpreted as comparisons of a
woman with herself at some other point in time;
for example, contrasting her wages when she was
childless with her wages after she became a moth-
er. Essentially by comparing a woman with her-
self, we eliminate the possibility that the OLS
analysis is confounded by contrasting childless
women with mothers; this is important if mothers
are different from childless women in some un-
measured way. This is also important in order to
accurately capture the motherhood penalty over
time because it allows for the possibility that the
type of women who become mothers has shifted
across cohorts not only in measured but also in
unmeasured ways. However, it is important to un-
derscore that fixed-effects models only take ac-
count of stable, unmeasured traits. If a particular
woman’s motivation or ambition changes over
time, this model will not hold these effects con-
stant.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the two
samples for the last respective year of data in-
cluded in the analysis (1985 for the NLS-YW and
1998 for the NLSY). The first set of columns re-
fers to all women, whereas the next two sets sub-
divide the samples into women without and wom-
en with children, respectively.
Among all women, the later cohort has a sig-
nificantly higher number of children (1.87 vs.
1.79). This is driven by a smaller percentage of
childless women; however, a two-tailed t test in-
dicates that the number of children among moth-
ers has remained stable across two cohorts. The
mean number of children for mothers is 2.25 for
women in the NLS-YW and 2.28 for the NLSY.
Education has also remained constant at a little
over 13 years of schooling on average.
In contrast, as expected from recent trends,
work experience has increased significantly. The
average number of years of full-time experience
is 5.70 for women in the early cohort, but 9.62
for women in the more recent sample. Similarly,
women in the earlier cohort have only 1.53 years
of average part-time experience, compared with
2.77 years for women in the NLSY. Despite the
increase in work experience, however, the mean
hourly wage (in 1993) dollars has remained stable:
$11.03 in the earlier and $11.19 in the more recent
cohort (p-value for two-tailed test 5 .47).
As the second and third sets of columns sug-
gest, in both cohorts, women without children are
more advantaged in terms of wages, education,
and work experience. At the same time, the gap
between mothers and childless women appears to
be closing on some variables. For instance, the
difference in hourly wage between childless wom-
en and mothers has lessened, from $3.14 for the
NLS-YW to $2.94 for the NLSY (in 1993 dol-
lars). Additionally, in terms of years of education-
al attainment, the gap between mothers and child-
less women used to be over a year and a half,
declining to 1.2 years in the more recent cohort.
In contrast, disparities in work experience are in-
creasing. In the early cohort, mothers had on av-
erage 1.53 fewer years of full-time work experi-
ence; in the late cohort, the difference was 3.06.
Multivariate Results
To examine the motherhood penalty, Table 2 pre-
sents results from the pooled OLS models. The
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TABLE 2. POOLED ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES (OLS) MODELS REGRESSING NATURAL LOG OF WAGES ON VARIOUS
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Note: The dependent variable is the natural log of the hourly wage. Only women with at least 2 years of reported wages
are included in the analysis. Data are weighed with the inverse of the number of times a respondent appears in the data.
The reference categories are 12 years of education and never married. NLS-YW 5 National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Women; NLSY 5 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.
*p , .05. **p , .01.
third column shows whether there are statistically
significant cohort differences in the effects of the
independent variables. The coefficient for number
of children indicates that, net of other variables,
each child depressed the wages of women in the
early cohort by about 1.6% and about 1% for
women in the more recent cohort. These coeffi-
cients are both statistically significant. The last
column shows, however, that the motherhood pen-
alty has not declined significantly over time.
The other variables in the equations generally
perform as expected, with full-time work experi-
ence, although not part-time, increasing the log of
a woman’s hourly wage. Schooling is also posi-
tively associated with wages, and women with
less than 12 years of education have significantly
lower wages than those who graduated from high
school. Compared with the never married, the for-
merly married earn more, but the currently mar-
ried earn about the same, and being Black has a
negative effect on hourly wages. In terms of
change over time, the effects have been fairly con-
stant, with the exception of 16 or more years of
education, which has become significantly more
valuable across time.
Table 3 shows the results of fixed-effects mod-
els. As the first row of the table shows, children
are associated with about a 3.8% penalty in the
early cohort; the effect of children in the more
recent cohort is quite similar at 3.3%. Tested ex-
plicitly, the decrease across cohorts is not statis-
tically significant. Note that the fixed-effect co-
efficients for children are greater than their
counterparts in the OLS regression models, which
implies that unobserved heterogeneity suppresses
the coefficients in the OLS models. Thus the OLS
models may be underestimating the motherhood
penalty.
With some slight variations from the OLS re-
sults, the other variables in the model generally
performed as expected. Work experience, both full
and part-time, is positively associated with wages,
although the squared term is negative. This sug-
gests that after a certain point, an additional year
of work experience does not yield as much of an
increase in wages as at lower levels of experience.
Education only has a significant effect for women
with 16 or more years of schooling. In the early
cohort, being married or having been married ap-
pears to decrease one’s wages relative to the never
married, whereas in the late cohort it increases
women’s wages. When tested for change across
cohorts, the results imply the effects of marital
status have increased. Age is only significant in
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Note: The dependent variable is the deviation of the natural log hourly wage from the mean natural log hourly wage for
the individual. The reference categories are 12 years of education and never married. NLS-YW 5 National Longitudinal
Survey of Young Women; NLSY 5 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.
*p , .05. **p , .01.
the early cohort, with the interaction terms indi-
cating that the effect of age has declined across
cohorts.
DISCUSSION
In recent decades, one of the most dramatic
changes in work behavior has been the movement
of mothers into paid employment. Whereas in pre-
vious periods women who had children, especially
White, middle-class women, largely left the labor
market, now the majority of mothers across the
social class spectrum remain employed. As the
work behavior of mothers and childless women
converge, we might expect a priori that the moth-
erhood penalty would decline over time. Not only
are human capital differences diminished, but fac-
tors such as employer discrimination could have
attenuated. For example, if employers become less
concerned that their female employees will even-
tually give birth and leave their jobs, they may
not relegate women, particularly mothers, to lower
level, dead-end jobs.
Drawing on data from the 1975–1985 NLS-
YW and the 1986–1998 NLSY, this study exam-
ined whether the motherhood penalty declined
over time. Our findings indicate that it has not.
For both cohorts of women, taking into account
an array of variables, children decrease women’s
wages significantly, and this penalty has been
quite stable. Moreover, this result holds in both
OLS and fixed-effects models.
Thus, although women’s labor force patterns
have changed and become more similar to men’s,
our analysis suggests that critical disparities re-
main. Given evidence that marriage and children,
if anything, increase men’s earnings (Cohen,
2002; Daniel, 1995; Waite, 1995), our findings
suggest that paid work and family is still more a
mother’s struggle than that of two parents. Hochs-
child’s (1989) description of a ‘‘stalled revolu-
tion’’ where women have begun to take on the
traditional male roles, yet are still responsible for
the ‘‘female’’ duties such as housework and child-
care, remains apt. Our findings are also consistent
with recent research demonstrating that although
married women are working longer into their
pregnancies and returning to work sooner, they
continue to be much more likely to reduce their
employment surrounding the transition to parent-
hood than married men. In fact, married men’s
employment levels remain unaffected by the birth
of a child (Lundberg & Rose, 2000; Noonan,
2001).
Further, in a quantitative analysis such as this
one, differences in variables affecting pay such as
work experience are swept away so that we are
left with two comparable groups; yet mothers and
childless women (or men) often do not have the
same observable characteristics. Given the current
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environment, even mothers who want to continue
their education or labor force participation may
have an extremely difficult time doing so. Addi-
tionally, women may decide to allocate more of
their time at home after experiencing barriers in
their workplace (Gerson, 1985), as a discouraging
situation may quash a woman’s workplace ambi-
tions. ‘‘Choices’’ are thus firmly entrenched in the
context of viability; if a woman cannot get ahead
in a job or share the child care equally with a
partner, her choices are limited.
Finally, it is essential to recognize that al-
though individual mothers incur these costs, the
benefits of children and motherhood are much
more widely dispersed. Mothers who, despite the
obstacles, are able to combine paid work and fam-
ily life are making important contributions to the
paid economy. Even more, the children they are
raising are, as some social scientists have argued,
‘‘public goods’’; society profits greatly from fu-
ture generations being reared as stable, well-ad-
justed adults, as well as future employees and tax-
payers (England & Folbre, 1991; Folbre, 1994).
Our study shows that, rather than being compen-
sated, women continue to be penalized for these
contributions.
There are a few limitations in our research.
First, it would be beneficial to have a longer time
span between the cohorts of women. Our two co-
horts entered the labor force approximately 10
years apart; greater change in the penalty, and per-
haps a decline, might have been observed with a
larger spread among the cohorts. Another limita-
tion is that we were only able to follow the sample
into their early 40s. It would be informative to
analyze women later in the life course when most
no longer have children at home because we do
not yet know if the disadvantages associated with
motherhood will continue long after children are
no longer a daily responsibility. Third, we did not
impute wages because our goal was to document
the actual penalty over time. However, as a result,
we lost a greater proportion of the earlier cohort
of women who did not have at least 2 years of
wages. Imputations could provide counterfactual
evidence that the penalty for the earlier cohort
would have been even more severe if more moth-
ers had stayed in the labor market.
Overall, our findings lead us to conclude that
if women continue to be the parents largely re-
sponsible for child care, mothers will be unable to
catch up to childless women or to men without
such responsibilities. As the majority of women
continue to have children, the motherhood penalty
is far reaching and will likely remain a critical
contributor to gender inequality in the workplace.
NOTE
An earlier version of this article was presented at the
annual meeting of the American Sociological Associa-
tion in Anaheim, California, 2001. We are grateful to
Laurie Morgan and Yu Xie for their helpful comments
and assistance. This research was supported by grants
from the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development (P30-HD10003 and T32-HD07339).
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APPENDIX





Fixed Effects (Table 3)
B SE B
Cohorta
Number of children 3 cohort
Full-time work experience 3 cohort
Full-time work experience squared 3 cohort
Part-time work experience 3 cohort
Part-time work experience squared 3 cohort
Age 3 cohort
Age squared 3 cohort
,12 years education 3 cohort
13–15 years education 3 cohort































































Note: aCohort: 0 5 NLS-YW, 1 5 NLSY. The dependent variable is the natural log of the hourly wage. Only women with
at least 2 years of reported wages are included in the analysis. Data are weighted with the inverse of the number of times
a respondent appears in the data. The reference categories are 12 years of education and never married. OLS 5 ordinary
least squares; NLS-YW 5 National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women; NLSY 5 National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth.
*p , .05. **p , .01.
